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[L. A. No. 24992. In Bank. Aug. 10, 1959.J 
UNION INTERCHANGE, INC. (a Corporation) et at, Re-
spondents, v. WYNNE A. SAVAGE, as Real Estate 
Commissioner, et al., Appellants. 
[1] Injunctions-Dissolution and Modification-Permanent Injunc-
tions.-A trial court has inherent power to modify or vacate a 
permanent preventive injunction on a showing that there has 
been a change in the controlling facts on which the injunction 
rested, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or 
where the ends of justice would be served by modification. 
This power is necessary because a preventive injunction is 
fundamentally different from any other judgment or decree; 
it is in essence of an executory or continuing nature, creating 
no rights but merely assuming to protect a right from unlawful 
and injurious interference. 
[2] Id.-Dissolution and Moditlcation.-When it can be shown that 
circumstances have so changed that an injunction is no longer 
necessary or desirable, the trial court has inherent power to 
amend it in the interest of providing justice for all parties in 
interest. 
[3] Id.-Dissolution and Moditlcation.-Unforeseen circumstances 
necessitating modification or dissolution of a preventive injunc-
tion may occur regardless of whether the injunction is "perma-
nent" or "preliminary" in form. 
[4] Id.-Dissolution and Moditlca.tion.-When an injunction decree 
is continuing in nature, directed at future events, it must be 
subject to adaptation as events may shape the need. In the 
case of a preliminary injunction, there may be need for 
adaptability to maintain the status quo pending final determi-
nation of the matter in controversy. 
r1] Power to alllend permanent injunction, notes, 68 A.L.R. 1180; 
136 A.L.R. 765. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Iujuudion!!, § 98; Am.Jur., 
Iujuucliulll!, * 314 et seq. 
MeR:. Dig. References: [1] Injullctions, § 81; [2-4] Injunctions, 
§78; [5-8] Injunctions, §79; [9,10] Injunctions, §88. 
o 
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[5] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Preliminary InjunctionR.-
Thr. power to modify 01' reyoke It pr'elimin:try injunction is I\n 
inherent powl'r not drpendent 011 statutr. 
[6] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Preliminary Injunctions. -
Code Civ. Proc., § 532, authorizes a motion to dissolve whE'n a 
preliminary injunction was granted without notice, but does 
not prevent the dissolntion of a preliminary injunction granted 
on notice. 
[7] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Temporary Injunctions.-
To require a specific reservation in an injunction order to re-
tain jurisdiction in the trial court to dissolve it would seem 
to place undue emphasis on formalism, and such requirement 
is not justified simply because the injunction is "temporary" 
in form. 
[8] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Preliminary Injunctions.-
The rule that a trial court has inherent power to modify or 
vacate a preventive injnnction on a proper showing applics 
to preliminary as well as permanent prevent.ive injunctions. 
(Overruling Ut~ited Railroads v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. 755 
[151 P. 129].) 
[9] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Discretion of Court.-The 
granting, denial, dissolving or refusing to dissolve a permanent 
or preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court on a consideration of all the particular circum-
stances in each case, and sueh order will not be modified or 
dissolved on appeal except for abuse of discretion. 
[10] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Discretion of Court.-It 
was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to dissolve a prelimi-
nary injunction restraining defendants from enforcement of 
the Advance Fee Amendments to the Business and Professions 
Code (Stats. 1955, ehap.-1678) as applied to plaintiffs, where 
no change of eirculllstances since the injunction was originally 
issued was urged for amending or dissolving it, where in view 
of substantial doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute 
the trial court could have found that irreparable injury would 
result fr01l1 a refusal to continue to enjoin its enforcement until 
final determination on the merits, and where, in light of the 
conflicting affidavits, it could not he said as a matter of law 
that plaintiffs' activities fell within the scope of the challenged 
legislation or that it was constitutional as it was sought to be 
applied to them. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County denying motion to vacute a pt'dilUiuary in-
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Edmund G. Brown and Stanley Mosk, Attorneys General, . 
Lee B. Stanton and Neal J. Gobar, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Appellants. 
Alvin G. Greenwald for Respondents. 
'I'RAYNOR, J.-On September 2, 1955, plaintiffs filed a 
complaint for declaratory relief and injunction, seeking a . 
declaration that their business operations were outside the 
scope of certain amendments to the Busincss and Professions 
Code relating to the regulation of real estate and busilles.-; 
opportunities transactions. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 10026, 
10131, 10132, 10134, 10252, 10252.5, 10253, 10253.5, 1025i:i, 
10305, 10501, 10502, 10506.) In the alternative they sought. 
a declaration that those sections were unconstitutional. They 'I' 
claimed that the application of those sections to their business I 
activities would violate constitutional guarantees of freedom 
of speech and press, due process of law, and equal protection 
of the law, and would contravene the commerce clause of 
the rllited States Constitution. They sought a preliminary 
injunction to stay enforcement of the amendments pending 
the action for declaratory relief and a permauent injunction 
restraining such enforcement after hearing and decision on the 
merits. After service of notice on defendants and a hearing 
on the order to show cause, the ·court on October 24, 1955, 
granted the preliminary injunction. That order restrains de-
fendants "pending the determination of this cause, from in-
terfering with the plaintiffs, their agents, servants, and em-
ployees, by instituting any criminal complaint, action or pro-
'ceeding against them for violation of ... the Advance Fee 
Amendments." No appeal was taken from tIle order. 
On October 1,1957, defendants presented a motion to vacate 
the preliminary injunction with supporting affidavits and 
points and authorities. The motion was based on the grounds 
that plaintiffs' activities were unlawful under legislation en-
acted before the effective date of the advance fee amendments, 
and that" a recent decision of the trial court in Connecticut 
held that the operations of the plaintiffs and cross-defendants 
were subject to the Connecticut Advance Fee Law which is ' 
substantially the same as that of California, and said court 
upheld the constitutionality of said law."1 Defendants ap-
'The (lecision hns since been reversed by the Supreme Court of Errors 
of Connecticut which held the ll"gislation uncol1stitutional. (United 
Illtl'rl'}Hmge v. Sl'elllU'Y, 1H Conn. 647 [136 A.2d 801].) 
604 UNION INTERCHANGE, INC. tI. SAVAGE [52 C.2d 
peal from an order of the trial court denying the motion to 
vacate the preliminary injunction. 
Plaintiffs contend that the order must be affirmed on the 
ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the 
. temporary injunction pending the trial on the merits. This 
contention lacks merit. [1] In Sontag Ohain Stores 00. v. 
Supel'ior Oourt, 18 Ca1.2d 92 [113 P.2d 689], we held that a 
trial court has inherent power to modify or vacate a permanent 
preventive injunction upon a showing that "there has been a 
change in the controlling facts upon which the injunction 
rested, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or 
where there the ends of justice would be served by modifica-
tion." (18 Ca1.2d at 95.) We recognized in that case that 
although "it is the long established policy of the law to •.. 
accord finality to judgments," the trial courts must be given 
power to modify or dissolve preventive injunctions issued by 
them. This power is necessary because a preventive injunc-
tion is fundamentally different from any other judgment or 
.decree: it "is in essence of an executory or continuing nature, 
creating no right but merely assuming to protect a right from 
unlawful and injurious interference." (18 Cal.2d at 94.) 
[2] When it can be shown that circumstances have so changed 
that an injunction is no longer necessary or desirable, the 
trial court has power to amend it in the interest of providing 
justice for all parties in interest. "The court's power in 
this respect is an inherent one." (18 Cal.2d at 94.) 
[3] The fact that a preventive injunction purports to be 
"permanent" or "preliminary" in form is not significant. 
Unforeseeable circumstances necessitating modification or dis-
solution of the injunction may occur in either case. [4] When 
the decree is continuing in nature, directed at future events, 
it inust be subject to adaptation as events may shape the need. 
In the case of a preliminary injunction, there may be need for 
adaptability to maintain the status quo pending final de-
termination of the matter in controversy. It would be in-
congruous to hold that the trial court has inherent power to 
modify a permanent preventive injullction, but lacks the ' 
power to modify a preliminary or temporary preventive in-
junction that may remain in force for years.2 
[5] This power has been recognized in such cases as 
Wheeler v. Super'jor Oourt, 82 Cal.App. 202 [255 P. 275], 
'The injunction in the present cnse, for example, was issued on October 
24, 11155. 
/,') 
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which held that the trial court had jurisdiction to modify or 
suspend a preliminary injunction when that right was re-
f;erved in the order. (See also State Oomp. Ins. Fund v. 
Maloney, 121 Cal.App.2d 33, 43 [262 P.2d 662] ; Tulare Irr. 
Dist. v. Superior Oourt, 197 Cal. 649, 666-667 [242 P. 725].) 
These cases support the view that the power to modify or 
revoke a preliminary injunction is an inherent power not de-
pendent upon statute, and that it was not the purpose of sec-
tion 532 of the Code of Civil Procedure to limit the trial 
court's discretion to modify its orders when fairness and 
equity so require.· [6] That section authorizes a motion to 
dissolve when a preliminary injunction was granted without 
notice. Plaintiffs' contention that the section prevents the dis-
solution of a preliminary injunction granted on notice is in-
consistent with the theory and holding of the cited cases. If a 
trial court does not have power to dissolve a preliminary in-
junction except in the manner provided by that statute, it is 
immaterial that it purports to retain such jurisdiction. The 
court could not by decree restore such jurisdiction in the face 
of valid statutory exclusion. 
[7] Moreover, to require a specific reservation in the order 
to retain jurisdiction in the trial court would seem to place 
undue emphasis on formalism. Such a requirement is not 
justified simply because the injullction is "temporary" in 
form. [8] The rationale of United Railroads v. Superi.or 
Oou,·t, 170 Cal. 755 [151 P. 129, Ann.Cas. 1916E 199], that 
the status of a case pending decision on the merits must be 
"definitely and finally determined once and for all," (170 
Cal. at 759) has been rejected and the case itself distinguished 
and modified in numerous later cases. (Sontag Ohain Stores 
00. v. Superi.or Oourt, 18 Cal.2d 92, 95-96 [113 P.2d 689] 
[citing Tulare Irr. Disi. v. Superior Oourt, 197 Cal. 649 [242 
P. 725] ; Wheeler v. Superior Oourt, 82 Cal.App. 202 [255 
P. 275] ; see also American Trading 00. v. Superior Omtrt, 
192 Cal. 770 [222 P. 142] ; Branker v. Superior OOllrt, 165 . 
'Section 532 provides, in part, that: ' 'If an injunction is granted 
without notice to the person enjoined, he may apply, upon reasonable 
notice to the judge who granted the injunction, or to the court in which 
the action was brought, to dissolve or modify the same." It would seem 
that the !!ection wall meant to serve as a guarantee that a party would 
have at least one hearing on the matter, rnther than as a general reo 
striction on the "(Iuity power of the courts. 'rhe (Iuotcd part of the scc-
tion WIlS rt'n<lered meaningle!!s by a 1911 umendment to the statute 
prohibiting the granting of a preliminary injunction without notice to 
the opposite party. (Code Civ. Proc., ~ 527.) 
C) 
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Cal.App.2d 816 [332 P.2d 711].) We have concluded there-
forE', that the United Railroads case should be overruled, and 
that the rule of the Sontag case applies to preliminary a.c; 
wen as permanent preventive injunctions. (See Branker v. 
Superior Court, 165 Cal.App.2d 816 [332 P.2d 711].) Thus, 
in the instant case the trial court had jurisdiction to consider 
and pass upon defendants' motion and to determine whether 
there has been a change in the controlling factors upon which 
the injunction rested or whether the ends of justice would be 
served by modification of the order. 
[9] Although the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain 
the motion, we have concluded that it did not abuse its dis-
cretion in refusing to vacate the preliminary injunction pend-
ing a hearing on the merits. "It is a rule so universally fol-
lowed and so often stated as to need only to be referred to 
that the granting, denial, dissolving or refusing to dissolve 
a permanent or preliminary injunction rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the par-
ticular circumstances of each individual case." (Kend.all v. 
Foulks, 180 Cal. 171, 174 [179 P. 886].) Such an order will 
not be modified or dissolved on appeal except for an abuse of 
discretion. (People v. Black's Food Store, 16 Cal.2d 59, 61 
[105 P.2d 361]; McCoy v. Matich, 128 Cal.App.2d 50, 52 
(274 P.2d 714]; Wilms v. Hand, 101 Cal.App.2d 811, 815 
[226 P.2d 728].) 
[10] Defendants contend that it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to refuse to dissolve the injunction on the 
grounds that: (1) the Advance Fee Amendments to the Bnsi-
ness and Professions Code (Stats. 1955, chap. 1678) are con-
stitutionalon their face; (2) as a matter of law plaintiffs' 
activities fall within the proscription of that legislation; and 
that (3) as a matter of law the injury to the public from plain-
tiffs' activities far outweighs any possible injury to plaintiffs 
from a refusal to enjoin the enforcement of the statute pending 
a final determination on the merits. These contentions lack 
merit. No change of circumstances since the injnnction was 
originally issned is urged for now amending or dissolving it. 
Since there is substantial doubt as to the constitutionality 
of the statute (see United Interchange v. Harding, 154 Me. 
128 [145 A.2d 94] [Maine]; United Interchange v. Spellacy, 
144 Conn. 647 [136 A.2d 801] [Conn.], holdiug similar It>gis-
latioll unconstitntiollal), the trial ('ol1rt could well have found 
that irreparable injury would result from a refusal to con-
C) 
Al1g.1959] SAN l<'RAN<!l::;CO BREWINU CORP.V. BOWMAN 60i 
152 C.2d 1lO7: 3t3 P.2d 11 
tinue to enjoin its enforcement until a final determination is 
made on the merits. Moreover, in light of the conflicting 
affidavits before the trial court, it cannot be said as a matter 
of law that plaintiffs' activities fall within the scope of the 
challenged legislation or that it is constitutional as it is sought 
to be applied to them. These questions can be determined 
more appropriately after a trial on the merits. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J.t and 
Peters, J.,·concurred. 
